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Abstract 
We develop a qualitative model of decision 
making with two aims: to describe how peo­
ple make simple decisions and to enable com­
puter programs to do the same. Current ap­
proaches based on Planning or Decision The­
ory either ignore uncertainty and tradeoffs, 
or provide languages and algorithms that are 
too complex for this task. The proposed 
model provides a language based on rules, 
a semantics based on high probabilities and 
lexicographical preferences, and a transpar­
ent decision procedure where reasons for and 
against decisions interact. The model is no 
substitute for Decision Theory, yet for deci­
sions that people find easy to explain it may 
provide an appealing alternative. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we develop a qualitative model of deci­
sion making with two aims: to describe how people 
make simple, everyday decisions and to enable com­
puter programs to do the same. Current approaches 
based on Planning [Weld, 1994] or Decision Theory 
[Raiffa, 1970] either ignore uncertainty and tradeoffs, 
or provide languages and algorithms that are too com­
plex for this task. The model proposed provides a 
simple language based on rules, a semantics based on 
high probabilities and lexicographical preferences, and 
a transparent decision procedure where reasons for and 
against decisions interact. 
The model is closely related to other qualitative 
abstractions of Decision Theory (e.g., [Pearl, 1993; 
Boutilier, 1994; Wilson, 1995]), yet it introduces as-
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sumptions that aim to account for the way deci­
sions are made in simple settings. In the proposed 
model, like in the findings of [Shafir et a!., 1993; 
Hogarth and Kunreuther, 1995], the reasons for de­
cisions play a central role. The result is an efficient, 
'anytime' decision procedure, which is easy to justify 
and explain. 
The paper is organized as follows. First we introduce 
the representation language (Section 2), the decision 
procedure (Section 3) and the semantics (Section 4). 
Then we discuss the relation to Decision Theory (Sec­
tion 5), sensitivity issues (Section 6), extensions (Sec­
tion 7), and related work (Section 8). 
2 LANGUAGE 
Models in the proposed framework contain four parts 
(see Fig. 1). 
1) a set of input propositions and observations defin­
ing the possible input situations, 
2) a set of goals and goals priorities defining the out­
put situations, 
3) a set of actions and action rules defining how input 
situations are mapped to output situations, and 
4) plausibility measures defining the plausibility of 
the input situations 
For example, a situation in which one has to decide 
whether to study for an exam or go to the beach can 
be modeled as: 
study 1\ get-it => pass-exam 
go-beach 1\ -.rain :::} enjoy-beach 
unlikely rain plausible get-it 
Here study and go-beach are the possible actions, 
rain and get-it are the input propositions and 
pass-exam and enjoy-beach are the positive goals in 
that order of importance. 
Input 
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Figure 1: The Decision Situation 
2.1 INPUT SITUATIONS 
The input situations or states stand for the possi­
ble truth assignments to the input propositions and 
represent the context of the decision. With each in­
put proposition y we associate a boolean variable Y 
such that y stands for Y = true and -.y stands for 
Y = false. We also use the notation Y to denote any 
of the literals y or -.y associated with the variable Y, 
and ---Y to denote its complement. The observations 
are input literals that have been found to be true. 
2.2 GOALS 
The goals stand for states of affairs that we care about. 
The positit1e goals are the ones that we want to achieve: 
getting a good job, enjoying a good day at the beach, 
watching a good movie, etc. The negative goals are the 
ones that we want to avoid: being dead, being thirsty, 
hurting people, missing an appointment, etc. 
In this model, the goals are represented by literals ( dif­
ferent from the input literals; yet see Section 7) de­
noted by symbols like x, x', .... The set of all goals 
is denoted by the letter G while the set of positive 
and negative goals by c+ and c- respectively. We 
use the words goal literals to refer to goals or their 
complements. 
As the example above suggests, some goals are more 
important than others : getting a good job is more im­
portant than watching a good movie , being not dead 
is more important than missing an appointment, etc. 
We represent the relative importance of goals by inte­
gers : the higher the integer, the higher the importance 
of the goal. We call such integers the priority of the 
goals, and write x E Gi to say that the priority of goal 
X is i (we will also write X E Gt or X E a; when we 
want to make explicit the polarity of the goal as well) . 
Schank and Abelson [1977] and Slade [1992] provide an 
interesting analysis of different types of goals (e.g., sat­
isfaction, enjoyment, achievement , preservation, etc.) 
and their relative priorities. 
Goal priorities are related to goal utilities, yet as de-
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grees of importance, we assume that goal priorities 
combine as follows: 
Assumption 1 Higher priority positive (negative) 
goals should be pursued (avoided) -even at expense 
of lower priority goals- except when success is deemed 
unlikely. 
This is a fundamental assumption in the model and 
says to focus on the actions that serve the most im­
portant goals, ignoring unlikely possibilities. This is 
not always a reasonable thing to do (see Section 6) but 
seems appropriate in the context of simple, everyday 
decisions. As we will see, this assumption will allow us 
cast the decision process as an argumentation process 
where reasons for and against decisions interact. 
Because goals are important , we also assume that goals 
that are not said to be true explicitly,1, are not true:2 
Convention 1 Goals are assumed not true by default. 
Due to this convention, there is a difference in this 
model between declaring X as a positive goal and its 
complement '"-'X as a negative goal. Even though in 
both cases we will try to achieve x and avoid �x, in 
the first case --x will be assumed true uy Jefaull while 
in the second x will. In line with this convention we 
require that if x is a goal , "-'X is not. 
2.3 ACTIONS AND ACTION RULES 
The third component of the model are the actions and 
the action rules. Action rules map input situations 
(truth assignments to the input literals) to output si­
tuations (truth assignments to the goal literals). They 
are expressed by means of expressions of the form: 
A 1\ C::::} X, where A is an action symbol, C is a con­
junction of input literals, and x is a goal literal (action 
symbols are distinct from input and output symbols) . 
Action rules are default rules in the sense that X is 
normally true after doing A when C is true. Each ac­
tion rule has a priority or strength measure represented 
by a non-negative integer; the higher the number, the 
higher the priority. These priorities will be used to dis­
ambiguate conflicts among rules; e.g., to make a rule 
A 1\ C ::::} x override a conflicting rule A 1\ C' =?'"'-'X of 
lower priority. Unless otherwise specified , all rules are 
assumed to have priority zero (lowest priority). 
Action rules which do not involve any actions, like 
knows-a-lot ::::} pass-exam, will be interpreted as 
1 Actually, there is no way to explicitly say that a goal is 
true in this language, yet see Section 7 for extensions that 
do. 
2We distinguish 'assumptions' from 'conventions' to em­
phasize that the latter are just a matter of convenience; 
they are not. built into the model like the former. 
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abbreviations of rules involving the special action 
do-nothing, e.g., do-nothing 1\ knows-a-lot :::? 
pass-exam. The action do-nothing is assumed al­
ways present and represents the choice of not taking 
any (other) action. As for other actions, we can also 
have rules involving the symbol do-nothing explicitly 
(e.g., if a person is seriously injured and you do noth­
ing, the person may die, etc.). 
2.4 INPUT PLAUSIBILITIES 
The last component of the model are the plausibili­
ties of the input propositions. For that we allow the 
following type of statements for any input literal Y: 
'likely y', 'plausible y' and 'unlikely Y'. Intu­
itively, these statements rank the prior probability of 
Y in decreasing order, with the first and last denoting 
probabilities that are very close to 1 and 0 respectively. 
The meaning of these statements will be made precise 
in terms of Spohn's [1988] ��:-functions. For the user's 
convenience we assume that: 
Convention 2 When the input statements do not 
contain information about the plausibility of an input 
literal Y, Y is assumed plausible. 
2.5 EXAMPLE 
The situation of going for the newspaper with or with­
out the umbrella can be modeled in this language by 
means of action rules like: 
go-without-umbrella :::} newspaper 
go-with-umbrella ::::>- newspaper 
go-without-umbrella 1\ rain ::::>- wet 
go-with-umbrella ::::>- carry 
We also have to say that the possible actions are 
go-with-umbrella and go-without-umbrella and 
that the goals (and their polarities and priorities) are 
carry E G]', wet E G'2 and newspaper E GI (i.e., 
getting the newspaper is the most important goal, and 
avoiding getting wet is more important than avoiding 
having to carry an umbrella). 
From the conventions above, it is implicit that rain 
is plausible (Convention 2), that each of the goals 
newspaper, wet and carry are true only when a rule 
asserting the goal is applicable (Convention 1), and 
that the action do-nothing does not achieve any goal. 
3 REASONS FOR DECISIONS 
We present now a mechanism for deciding which action 
to choose in a given context. The mechanism is based 
on the interplay of reasons. The procedure is efficient 
and easy to justify and explain. We start defining the 
reasons for decisions. 
Basically, we will say that a positive (negative) goal 
x provides a reason for (against) action A when the 
action A contributes to the truth of x. The polarity 
of this reason is the polarity of the goal (positive or 
negative); the tmportance of the reason is the priority 
of the goal (0, 1, . . .  , N); and the strength of the reason 
is the measure to which the action contributes to the 
truth of the goaL 
More formally, let us say that a literal Y is likely when 
Y is an observation or when the information provided 
by the user contains likely Y or unlikely ,...,y, and 
that Y is unlikely when its complement is likely, and 
plausible when Y is neither likely nor unlikely. Simi­
larly, let us say that a rule A 1\ C ::::>- X is likely when 
each conjunct in C is likely, that is unlikely when some 
conjunct in C is unlikely, and that is plausible when 
it is neither likely nor unlikely. Then, the reasons for 
decisions and their strengths are defined as follows: 
Definition 1 A positive (negative) goal x provides a 
strong reason for (against) an action A when some 
rule A 1\ C :::? x is likely and no rule of the form A 1\ 
C' :::?"-' x with equal or higher pnority is either likely 
or plausible. 
Definition 2 A positive (negative) goal x provides a 
weak reason for (against) an action A when it does 
not provide a likely reason for A and yet some rule 
A 1\ C => x is either likely or plausible, and no higher 
priority rule A 1\ C' ::::>-"'X is likely. 
Definition 3 A positive (negative) goal x provides a 
empty reason for (against) an action A when it does 
not provide a strong or weak reason for (against) A. 
As an illustration, the goal newspaper provides 
a strong reason for go-with-umbrella and for 
go-•li thout-umbrella; wet provides a weak reason 
against go-without-umbrella, and carry provides 
a weak reason against go-with-umbrella. Likewise, 
each of these goals provide empty reasons for or against 
do-nothing. 
Clearly, decisions over a single goal can be taken by 
considering the strength and polarity of the reasons 
involved. 
Definition 4 An action A is better than an action 
B over a positive goal x when X provides a stronger 
reason for A than forB. 3 Likewise, A is better than B 
over a negative goal x if X provides a stronger reason 
against B than against A. 
3Strong reasons are stronger than weak reasons, and 
weak reasons are stronger than empty reasons. 
When there are many goals involved, the more impor­
tant goals are considered first: 
Definition 5 An action A is better than an action 
B, written A > B, when A is better than B over a 
goal x and B is no better than A over any goal x as 
important as or more important than x. 
The overall best actions are the actions that are no 
worse than any other action. We can test whether 
an action A is better than an action B by invoking 
the procedure better?( A, B, i) that iteratively checks 
whether A gets more compelling reasons than B from 
goals in G;, where i is a priority level initially set to 
the top priority N. Indeed, better? must return no 
when some positive (negative) goal provides a stronger 
reason forB (A) than for A (B); yes when the oppo­
site is true, and must call itself with the value of i 
decreased when neither condition holds, returning no 
when i < 0. In the worst case, the complexity of this 
method is: 
Proposition 1 The best actions can be computed in 
this way in time proportional to A2 x R, where A is 
the number of actions and R is the total number of 
rules. 
This complexity of this method is moderate, yet a 
more efficient procedure can be used when goals are 
linearly ordered (i.e., when no pair of goals have the 
same priority). If A stands for the set of all actions and 
i is a priority level (initially set to N), select( A, i) 
can compute the best actions by retaining in A, in 
each iteration, only the actions that get the strongest 
(weakest) reason from the single positive (negative) 
goal in Gi. This iteration terminates when i < 0 or 
when A becomes a singleton. 
In the example above, do-nothing is pruned from A in 
the first iteration because it only gets an empty reason 
from the positive goal newspaper. In the second itera­
tion, go-t;il'i thout-umbrella is also pruned as it gets a 
strong negative reason from the goal wet. The action 
go-with-umbrella then is the single best action as it 
is the only action left in A. 
3.1 EXAMPLE 
Consider whether to approach some animal, e.g., a 
dog, that we don't know whether it is aggressive or 
not: 
approach => satisfy-curiosity 
approach!\ aggressive => get-hurt 
In this case, satisfy-curiosity is a low priority 
positive goal and get-hurt is a high priority nega­
tive goal. Given no other information, aggressive 
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is assumed plausible by convention, and hence, the 
action approach gets a strong positive reason from 
satisfy-curiosity and a weak negative reason from 
get-hurt. Yet since get-hurt is the most important 
goal, the action approach is rejected for do-nothing 
which gets no (weak or strong) negative reasons. Note, 
however, that if observations lead to us revise the 
chances of aggressive to unlikely, the preferences 
would get reversed. 
4 SEMANTICS 
The semantics will make precise the meaning of all 
the constructs in the model and will provide an inde­
pendent criterion for assessing the decision procedures 
above. ln Decision Theory, actions A are ranked by 
their expected utility: 
EU(A) 
= 
L P(s) L PA(s'ls) U(s') (1) 
where the s and s' denote the input and output states 
respectively. Here we use an approximation of this 
criterion with Spohn's [1988] ��:-functions in place of 
probabilities, and lexicographical orderings in place of 
utility functions. 
4.1 BELIEFS 
Spohn [1 988] describes a model for uncertain reasoning 
that combines the main intuitions underlying proba­
bility theory (context dependence, conditionalization, 
etc.) with the notion of plain beliefs (see also [Gold­
szmidt and Pearl, 1992]). Beliefs in Spohn's model 
are represented by means of a function K that assigns 
a non-negative integer measure to each world w and 
that satisfies the following calculus:4 
;;;(p) E [0, oo] , K(p) = millwl=p K(w) (2) 
K(p V •p) = 0, K(plq) = K(p 1\ q)- K(q) (3) 
This calculus is structurally similar to the calculus of 
probabilities with products replaced by sums and sums 
replaced by minimizations. Spohn indeed showed that 
the first can be understood as an abstraction of the sec­
ond with K measures standing for order-of-magnitude 
probabilities. 
Lower 11: measures stand for higher probabilities and 
higher K measures stand for lower probabilities. Spohn 
indeed refers to the K measures as degrees of surprise 
or disbelief, hence regarding a proposition p as plau­
szble or believable when r.:(p) = 0 and as unlikely or 
disbelieved when ��:(p) > 0. In particular, since the 
axioms rule out two complementary propositions from 
4 K:(p) == oo when p is unsatisfiable. 
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being disbelieved at the same time, a proposition p is 
accepted or believed when its negation is disbelieved 
(i.e., when ��:(-,p) > 0). 
4.1.1 INPUT BELIEFS 
We use Spohn's 11: functions to formalize the beliefs 
��:(Y) in the inputs propositions and the beliefs KA(xlt�) 
in the output propositions given an input state and 
action. For the inputs beliefs, we assume that:5 
Assumption 2 Input variables are assumed to be in­
dependent. 
This means that, in analogy to probabilities, the belief 
in an input state is the aggregation of the beliefs in the 
input literals true in that state: 
n 
��:(Yt, . . . , Yn) = L K(Y;) (4) 
i=l 
These beliefs in turn are provided by the user or as­
sumed by default (Convention 2): 
( ) { 1 if unlikely Y; or likely �Y; K Y i = 0 otherwise (5) 
These two equations determine the prior plausibility 
��:(s) of any input state s completely. The posterior 
plausibility ��:(slobs) given a set of observations (input 
literals) can be derived from (3) as ��:(slobs)= K(s)­
��:(cbs) if s satisfies cbs, and oo otherwise. 
4.1.2 GOAL BELIEFS 
For any goal literal x, the plausibility of x given an 
action A and an input state s is expressed by the equa­
tion : 
KA(x) = min(��:(s) + KA(xls)) (6) 
• 
which is the qualitative version of the equation 
PA(x) = 2::, P (s)PA(xls). 
From Equations 4 and 5, we know how to determine 
the plausibilities ��:(s); we are thus left to determine the 
conditional plausibilities KA(xls). These plausibilities 
will be extracted from the rules that are applicable in 
the state s that relate A to x. 
Let r(A) denote the set of action rules involving the 
action A. Then we say that the input state s supports a 
literal x when there is a rule in r(A) whose consequent 
is x, whose conditions are true in s, and for which all 
conflicting rules in r( A) whose conditions are true in 
s have equal or lower priority. 
The plausibilities KA(xls) are then defined to capture 
Convention 1 (goals are assumed false by default) and 
5We will show how to relax this assumption in Section 7. 
the intuition that supported literals should be either 
likely or plausible (they have a justification): 
when x is supported by s, or when 
�x is a goal not supported by s 
otherwise 
(7) 
Equations 4-7 determine the measures ��:A(x) for any 
value X and any action A. When input observations 
obs are gathered, the conditional measure KA(xlcbs) 
can be obtained by replacing the prior plausibility 11: ( s) 
in Equation 6 by the posterior plausibility ��: (slobs). 
4.1.3 EXAMPLE 
We illustrate these definitions in the newspaper exam­
ple. Because the only input variable is rain, which 
is assumed plausible by default, the input states are 
s ={rain} and s' ={--.rain} with ��:(s) = K(s') = 0. 
If A, B and C denote the actions go-without­
umbrella, go-with-umbrella and do-nothing, the 
literals supported by each action in each input situa­
tion are: 
s =rain s' =-,rain 
A {news, wet, -,carry} {news, -,wet, -,carry} 
B {news ,-.wet, carry} {news ,-,wet ,carry} 
c {-,news ,-,wet ,-,carry} {-,news ,-,wet, -,carry} 
From this table and Equations 4-7, the plausibilities 
of all goal literals can be computed; e.g., KA (wet) = 
min{��:(s) + KA(wetls),��:(s') + KA (wetls')} = min{O + 
0, 0 + 2} = 0. 
4.2 PREFERENCES OVER ACTIONS 
To rank the actions, we define the qualitative utility of 
a goal x, written u(x), as: 
u(x) = polarity(x) x priority(x) (8) 
Namely, for wet E a;;, u(wet) = -2, while for 
newspaper Eat, u(newspaper) = 3. 
Provided with these measures, we could define the 
qualitative expected utility of actzons relative to a goal 
x, following the methods in [Pearl, 1993] or [Wilson, 
1995], e.g., setting it to max(O, u(x)-KA (xlobs)) when 
x is positive. The problem with these schemes is that 
they impose a very strong requirement on the way util­
ity measures are encoded so they can be added up, in 
the same scale, with K measures (see [Wilson, 1995]). 
Here we take a different approach which does not re­
quire goal priorities and plausibility judgements to be 
so calibrated. In the proposed scheme, only two things 
matters: the ordinal ranking of goals, and whether 
goals are deemed likely, unlikely or plausible. This is 
done by defining the qualitative belief in a goal litem! 
x as: 
bA(x) = �>:A(-.xlobs)- KA(xlobs) (9) 
and defining the qualitatwe rank of an action A relative 
to a goal x as:6 
Qx(A) = sign(u(x)  x sign(bA(x)) (10) 
In other words, an action has a positive rank relative 
to a goal x (Qx(A) = 1) when it's likely to make 
the positive (negative) goal X true (false); it has a 
negative rank (Qx (A) = -1) when it's likely to make 
the positive (negative ) goal x false (true); and it has 
an null rank otherwise (Qx(A):::: 0). Clearly, 
Definition 6 An actio n A is preferred to an action B 
over a goal x ifQx(A) > Qx(B) .  
In the presence of multiple goals , this ordering is ex­
tended by considering more important goals first : 
Definition 7 An action A is preferred to an action 
B, written A ?- B, if A zs preferred to B over some 
goal X, and B is not preferred to A over any goal x' 
with equal to or higher priority than X. 
The overall optimal actions determined by this prefer­
ence relation are dosely related to the actions that re­
sult from the decision procedures based on rules (Sec­
tion 3). Indeed, if we say that a theory is positive 
when the rules do not involve negative literals in their 
bodies we get that: 
Proposition 2 The decision procedures based on in­
teractio n of rea so ns are sound and complete for posi­
tive theories. 
The condition of positivity is required because the 
procedures do not reason by cases and thus cannot 
properly handle pairs of rules like A 1\ p :::} x and 
A 1\ -.p :::} x. Under this condition, Proposition 1 guar­
antees that the problem of identifying the best actions 
can be computed efficiently. 
4.2.1 EXAMPLE 
The table below summarizes the qualitative rank of 
the actions relative to each of the goals newspaper, 
wet and carry: 
Action 
go-without-umbrella: 
go-with-umbrella: 
do-nothing: 
{ n, w, c } 
{+1, +0, +1} 
{+1, +1, -1} 
(-1,+1,+1} 
6The function sign maps positive numbers into 1, neg­
ative numbers into -1, and 0 into 0. 
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The preferences among the actions are easy to visualize 
as they correspond to the lexicographical preferences 
among their corresponding vectors (in this case, no 
pair of goals have the same priority). The table makes 
evident that go-with-umbrella is the best action in 
this case. On the other hand , if rain were unlikely, 
the first entry below vet would become + 1, and the 
best action would become go-without -umbrella. 
5 RELATION TO DECISION 
THEORY 
The optimal action A from a decision theoretic point of 
view is the action that maximizes the expected utility 
(Equation 1). The model can be understood as assum­
ing that the utility function U(s) is additivel y decom­
posable as U(s) = l:xEs U(x), where x is the value 
of variable X in the output situation s, and that the 
utility of positive (negative) goals xis a fixed positive 
(negative) value Ux and the utility for the negation of 
a goal is 0. From these assumptions, it is possible to 
show that Equation 1 can be expressed as: 
EU(A) = L Ux PA(x) (11) 
XEG 
Furthermore, the model assumes that terms U x P A ( x) 
make terms Ux•PA(x') negligible when PA(x) » 
PA (x') ('unlikely scenarios are ignored') and that 
lUx I » I Ux• I when the priority of X is higher than 
the priority of x' ('low priority goals are traded by 
higher priority goals'). 
6 SENSITIVITY ISSUES 
It is not hard to think of cases where the assumptions 
embedded in this model are not reasonable. Consider 
for example a situation in which a patient has a very 
serious disease which if not treated will result in his 
death. Moreover, there is only one possible treatment 
and such treatment does not always work, and in all 
cases it has undesirable side-effects like loosing hair, 
vomiting, etc. 
do-nothing => death 
treatment 1\ -.effective => death 
treatment => side-effects 
Here the goals death and side-effects are both neg­
ative and the first is significantly more important than 
the second. 
The atom effective provides the condition under 
which the treatment works. If the prior plausibility 
measure of effective is 0 (the treatment can plau­
sibly work) the model recommends treatment. Yet if 
104 Bonet and Geffner 
the prior plausibility measure of effective is 1 (the 
treatment most likely will not work) the model will 
recommend to do nothing (i.e., the action do-nothing 
will be preferred to treatment) . 
One way to look at the second scenario is that the 
model prefers the lottery 'certain death' to the lottery 
'certain side-effects and very likely death'. This pref­
erence, which is not reasonable, results from regarding 
unlikely scenarios as impossible ones. This assump­
tion, in cases where important goals are at stake, is 
actually far from appropriate. 
We can measure though how robust an optimal deci­
sion is by considering how it is affected by changes in 
the input parameters (goal priorities and input plau­
sibilities). 
Let us say that a goal X justifies the preference of 
action A over action B if A is preferred to B over x 
and yet A and B are equally preferred over all goals 
with higher priority than x. 
For example, when the treatment is unlikely to work, 
the goal that justifies the decision do-nothing over 
treatment is side-effects. On the other hand, 
when the treatment can plausibly work, do-nothing 
becomes inferior to treatment because of the goal 
death. Since death is considerably more important 
than side-effects the proper selection of the param­
eter K( effective) in this case is critical. More gener­
ally, when minimal changes in an input parameter lead 
to abrupt changes in the importance of the goals that 
are obtained the optimality of the decisions need to 
be reconsidered. This critical tradeoff can be detected 
in this model, yet the same model is not sufficiently 
expressive to resolve them. Often, however, there may 
be no reasonable ways for resolving such tradeoffs. 
7 EXTENSIONS 
The expressive power of the model is limited yet thert' 
are a number of extensions that can be accommodated. 
First, we can relax the assumptions that input vari­
ables be independent by accommodating input rules 
in addition to action rules. These input rules will im­
pose a causal structure on the input variables which 
can be interpreted as in [Goldszmidt and Pearl, 1992] 
or [Geffner, 1996a]. Semantically the only difference is 
in the determination of the plausibilities of the input 
state K(s) . 
Second, we can interpret the input and output situa­
tions as referring to the state of the world before and 
after the action. The values of variables that occur in 
both the inputs and the outputs can then be assumed 
to persist by default [Gelfand and Lifschitz, 1993; 
Geffner, 1996b]. This can enable us to express se­
quential decision problems, where the choice of opti­
mal actions is replaced by the choice of optimal action 
sequences. 
In many cases, we may also need a way for representing 
and aggregating preferences among equally important 
goals. That is, two goals may be equally important and 
yet one may be preferred to the other; e.g., going to 
see the 'Knicks' vs. going to see the 'Mets'. A possible 
approach in this case is to express these preferences by 
means of integers and to aggregate such preferences by 
some form of weighted addition according to whether 
the goals are rendered likely, plausible or unlikely by 
the actions. 
8 RELATED WORK 
The proposed model for decisions is related to other 
qualitative abstractions of decision theory and to in­
formal models of decisions based on the interplay of 
reasons. 
Qualitative models of decision making have received 
considerable attention in recent years [Pearl, 1993; 
Boutilier, 1994; Dubois and Prade, 1995; Wilson, 
1995]. All of these proposals have in common the use of 
qualitative measures for representing preferences and 
beliefs, yet compared to this work, few have placed 
emphasis on modeling (yet, see [Brewka and Gordon, 
1995]) and in the mechanisms for computing and ex­
plaining decisions. 
The work differs from [Pearl, 1993] and [Wilson, 1995] 
in the way utility ranks and II': measures are combined. 
Pearl and Wilson assume that these measures are cali­
brated so that they can be added up in the same scale. 
Thus, a likely world with utility rank 1 is deemed as 
good as an unlikely world with utility measure 2. Our 
choice here is different: our priority measures are com­
pletely ordinal and represent the importance of goals. 
Our criterion is that most important goals dominate 
less important goals except when the former are un­
likely to be realized. 
The two criteria can be usefully contrasted in the sim­
ple case in which there is a single positive goal x in­
volved. This scenario can be expressed in Pearl's and 
Wilson's framework by partioning the set of worlds 
into two sets: the worlds w+ that satisfy x, which 
get a utility rank 1-l( w+) = 1, and the worlds w- that 
do not satisfy x, which get a utility rank 1-l( w- ) = 
0. A weakness of Pearl's and Wilson's scheme is 
that they fail to prefer actions A that make x likely 
c�A(-.x) > 0) to actions B that make X just plausi­
ble (�B(x) = ro:8(-.x) 
= 
0). Both actions get actually 
the same expected utility rank in their scheme. Inter-
estingly this is not solved when the worlds w- that 
do not satisfy the goal are assigned a negative utility 
rank p,(w-) = -1. In that case, Pearl's and Wilson's 
schemes will label the actions B that make the goal 
x plausible, ambiguous. We, on the other hand, rank 
such actions below the actions A that make X likely, 
and above the actions C that make x unlikely. 
The procedures considered in Section 3 are related also 
to informal models of decision based on the interplay 
of reasons. For example, when one action A gets either 
positive or negative (non-empty) reasons such that no 
other action gets (non-empty) reasons of the same im­
portance, the action A can immediately be accepted, 
if the reasons are positive, and rejected, if the reasons 
are negative. These type of situations, where there are 
clear and compelling reasons for accepting or rejecting 
decisions, seem to be the ones people feel most com­
fortable with and have been studied in [Shafir et a/., 
1993]. 
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